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Abstract 
We propose both a monopoly and a duopoly model of a two-sided market. Both settings are 
fully comparable, as we impose a homogeneous good produced at zero costs without capacity 
constraints, as well as identical parameterization of market sizes. We determine the duopoly 
equilibrium and the monopoly optimum in terms of the parameters and obtain solutions with 
and without subsidization (prices below marginal cost) of one market side. We show that 
there exists a continuum of economically plausible parameter sets for which duopoly 
equilibrium prices exceed optimal monopoly prices and one with no observable price effect of 
competition, i.e. one where optimum and equilibrium prices become equal. Despite the fact 
that virtually everything except for the number of platform operators is identical in the latter 
situations, total demand on both market sides in the duopoly market exceeds total demand in 
the monopoly market. Furthermore, even though there is no observable price effect, there is 
still a competitive effect in so far that total profits in the duopoly equilibrium are strictly 
smaller than monopoly profits. The relationship of total welfare is ambiguous in subsidization 
cases, while it is strictly greater in duopoly, if no subsidization takes place. Our results 
sharply contradict economic intuition and common economic knowledge from one-sided 
markets. 
 
Keywords: two-sided markets, platform competition, price-concentration relationship, 
welfare analysis 
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1. Introduction and Literature Review 
 
The well-known literature on network effects studies markets, in which firms face a group of 
more or less homogeneous customers with externalities emerging “within” this group. On the 
other hand, there are many markets, in which firms face two or more distinct and 
distinguishable customer groups with externalities emerging “in between” these groups. In 
media economics this setting describes the relation of the media provider, media consumers, 
and advertisers. There it is termed “circulation industry” (Chaudhri (1998)) or “dual product 
market” (Picard (1989)). In Industrial Organization, this setting became prominent as “two-
sided market” following the seminal analyses by Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Caillaud and 
Jullien (2003). 
Rochet and Tirole (2003) instance credit cards as an example of a two-sided market: 
Consumers and retailers constitute two distinct and distinguishable groups of customers to a 
credit card provider. The number of retailers who wish to be connected to a specific credit 
card network is affected by the number of consumers who wish to pay using this credit card. 
Vice versa, the number of consumers who apply for a specific credit card is affected by the 
number of retailers who accept it. The externality is positive for both market sides in this 
example: Increasing demand by one group increases demand by the other group. 
The features of two-sided markets are, however, hard to generalize. For instance, two-sided 
markets might as well be characterized by negative externalities or externalities might be 
positive for one side and negative for the other side, as will be discussed for the example of 
advertising further below. 
Furthermore, credit cards are a club good to both market sides, which means that specific 
consumers and retailers can be excluded from the service, but there is no rivalry in 
consumption of a credit card service. Obviously, other goods feature different characteristics, 
that is, they might be either rival or non-rival in consumption, and they might be excludable 
or non-excludable or their characteristics might depend on the market side. For instance free-
to-air radio broadcasts are a public good (non-rival, non-excludable) to the audience, but since 
advertising slots are naturally limited by the available air time, advertising slots are a private 
good (rival, excludable) to advertisers. 
Third, credit cards are goods that allow for joint consumption also known as “multi-homing”. 
That is, a consumer might well own more than one credit card at the same time (and even use 
more than one card for the same transaction by splitting the amount invoiced), and retailers 
might accept more than one card. Other two-sided markets require one or both market sides to 
decide for exactly one provider (or, of course, none at all). For instance, a moviegoer has to 
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decide for exactly one cinema on a Saturday night, but a firm can place advertisements in 
more than one movie theater. 
Fourth, credit cards are a homogeneous product. That is, differences in utility from using the 
one or the other credit card service only stem from price differences and the two-sided market 
effect, i.e. the diffusion of a specific service on the other market side. Other two-sided 
markets allow for product differentiation, e.g. in the newspaper market, there might be 
differentiation according to political views or intellectual level of the target group. 
Finally, there are differences in strategic interaction in terms of timing (simultaneous or 
sequential action) and the strategic variables (price or quantity) used by the players in a two-
sided market game. 
 
Because of this, the literature on two-sided markets tailors models around specific examples. 
Armstrong's (2006) study provides a variety of constellations, including those studied by 
Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Rochet and Tirole (2003). Armstrong (2006) derives optimal 
pricing rules for monopoly and duopoly markets in terms of elasticities and provides some 
applications, e.g. to advertising. He finds that there is no difference in advertising prices 
between monopolies and oligopolies, given media consumers must single-home and 
advertisers can multi-home - a constellation he calls “competetive bottlenecks”. He argues 
that competition only emerges on the market for media consumers: Media providers compete 
for consumers, since advertisers’ demand depends on the number of consumers that are 
exposed to the advertisement, and consumers need to single-home. However, media providers 
are still monopolists when providing their consumers’ attention to the advertiser, because a 
specific consumer can ony be reached by advertising with the provider this consumer chose. 
Nilssen and Sørgard (2001) and Gabszewicz et al. (1999) study TV advertising as a sequential 
two-sided market game in which advertising revenues finance programming investments of 
TV stations. Nilssen and Sørgard (2001) show -in contrast to Armstrong's (2006) result- that 
in this case the advertising price in a symmetric duopoly is always lower than in a monopoly. 
Although the price is lower in duopoly, the total amount of advertising might be lower than in 
monopoly. This is because each duopolist’s programming investment is lower than the 
monopolist’s one. Lower programming investment implies lower program quality which in 
turn implies a lower number of viewers. This lower number of viewers might offset the 
increasing demand for advertising caused by the lower duopoly advertising price, and cause a 
decrease in the total amount of advertising. 
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While there seems to be broad consensus in that the externality of a large audience on 
advertising demand is positive, there is some dissent about the effect in the other direction. 
Theoretical models, e.g. those of Nilssen and Sørgard (2001) and Gabszewicz et al. (1999) 
mentioned above, usually assume that media consumers wish to consume the media content 
only, and are “coerced” to consume advertising as well. Empirical results support this “ad-
aversion” assumption for television viewers (see e.g. Danaher (1995), Wilbur (2007)), but 
reject it for print media, where readers’ attitude towards advertising seems to be driven by the 
informative value of the advertisement (Kaiser and Song (2009), Rysman (2004)). This 
example supports our earlier statement that it is hard to generalize two-sided market models, 
and the approach of the literature to tailor models to specific examples. 
 
Chaudhri (1998) and Dewenter (2006) develop two-sided market models of a newspaper 
monopoly. Comparing the optimal monopoly advertising and consumer prices and the 
competitive market outcome, Chaudhri (1998) finds that the optimal monopoly consumer 
price might be even lower than the competitive one, because increased circulation on the 
monopoly market yields higher advertising revenue. However, Chaudhri (1998) does not 
model demand explicitly and ignores the feedback effect of circulation on advertising 
demand. The increase in advertising revenue in his analysis stems from the pricing model 
(per-contact-pricing) for advertising. Advertising demand itself is not affected by circulation. 
Häckner and Nyberg (2008), and similarly Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006), also having  
newspaper markets in mind, propose a two-sided market model with endogeneous market 
structure (duopoly or monopoly). In a simultaneous game, they examine conditions for 
symmetric and asymmetric duopoly equilibria as well as conditions for a natural monopoly. 
Product differentiation is a crucial feature of their model that drives the resulting market 
structure. Another basic assumption through most of their study is a positive externality of 
advertising on consumer demand, i.e. they assume that readers like advertising. In case of a 
negative effect of advertising on consumers, however, they find that only symmetric 
equilibria can exist. 
 
The aim of the present paper is to compare prices on two-sided monopoly and duopoly 
markets in more detail than it was done in previous literature. Unlike previous literature, we 
neither allow for product differentiation, since it would make us compare apples and oranges, 
nor do we impose structural differences in terms of costs or capacity constraints that might 
favor the one or the other market structure. We also sacrifice generality by restricting our 
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model to a “competitive bottleneck” scenario and by introducing explicit utility functions for 
the agents on both market sides, which enables us to parameterize our model and to obtain 
results in terms of the parameters. We use these results to study the behavior of the outcomes 
in monopoly and duopoly depending on the parameters. We are especially interested in the 
question of whether there are economically plausible parameter sets that equalize prices in 
monopoly and duopoly or yield even higher prices in duopoly than in monopoly, which would 
sharply contradict economic intuition and common economic knowledge from one-sided 
markets. 
 
The question of price changes with regard to market structure becomes relevant when policy 
makers consider subsidies in order to attract new entrants to given monopoly markets. 
Reversely, antitrust authorities need to assess the impact of mergers on prices. A positive 
correlation of price and market concentration is also the fundamental assumption of the 
empirical price-concentration literature that aims at measuring the price effect of market 
concentration.  
The paper generally contributes to the literature on two-sided markets by explicitly comparing 
monopoly and duopoly outcomes on a competitive bottleneck two-sided private good market. 
It is therefore complementary to Nilssen and Sørgard (2001) who study a two-sided market 
where the good is public to one side, but private to the other side of the market, Weyl (2006), 
who studies pricing in the Rochet and Tirole (2003) framework, and a refinement of 
Armstrong's (2006) “competitive bottleneck” scenario. 
 
To help the reader grasp the economic intuition behind the model, we will follow the common 
habit of the literature and refer from time to time to a specific example, namely to the one of 
mainstream movie theaters. In contrast to the aforementioned TV broadcasts, movie theaters 
provide a private good to both advertisers and moviegoers, since individuals on both market 
sides can easily be excluded. A consumer feels rivalry in consumption at least if her favorite 
seat is already taken. Advertisers feel rivalry, because consumer attention will decrease the 
more advertisements are shown. The example fits the competitive bottleneck scenario, 
because by nature consumers can only visit one cinema at the same time, hence they must 
single-home, while advertisers can place advertisements in more than one cinema, hence they 
can multi-home. Mainstream movie theaters are usually large multiplex facilities that feature 
the latest projection and audio technology and the same portfolio of the latest movies. 
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Therefore, in the duopoly case, an average consumer will have no intrinsic preference for the 
one or the other cinema: both facilities are homogeneous. 
The paper is constructed as follows: First we develop a monopoly model and derive the 
monopolist’s optimal pricing policy. Second, we suggest a model of duopolistic competition 
that is founded on the same assumptions as the monopoly model, thus being fully comparable 
to the monopoly case. In Section 4, we compare the equilibrium outcome in the duopoly case 
and the monopolist’s optimum, and highlight some implications of our findings in Section 5. 
 
2. The Monopoly Model 
 
Consider a two-sided market for a consumption good that is offered in combination with 
advertising. To foster intuition and readability, we will label customers on the one market side 
“consumers” and customers on the other market side “advertisers”. In this section, we assume 
that the market is served by a monopolistic platform operator. Similar to Anderson and 
Gabszewicz (2006), we assume that consumers are homogeneous, except for their preference 
for the good (e.g. “movie theater experience”). Let the individual net utility function be 
additive-separable and given by 
(1)  { }1,0,)( ∈⋅−⋅⋅−⋅= ccccaccc qqpqdeqqU θ , 
where pc is the price for one unit of the consumption good, while θ is the taste parameter or 
marginal willingness to pay, qc is the quantity, and e is a parameter for the influence of 
advertising on the individual’s utility. Heterogeneous preferences for the good are reflected 
by θ, which is assumed to be continuously distributed on the interval [0, msc], where msc > 0 
determines the market size for the considered goods market. We limit qc to the values 0 and 1, 
so that the individual’s decision problem is reduced to whether or not to consume a single unit 
of the good (e.g. whether to go to the movies or not).  Obviously, an individual demands the 
good, if its net utility of doing so is greater than the net utility of refraining from 
consumption, that is if 
cacc pdeUU +⋅≥⇔=≥ θ0)0()1(  
holds. Therefore, we obtain 
(2) ( ) cac
ms
pde
acc pdemsddpd
c
ca
−⋅−=⋅= ∫
+⋅
θ1,  
as the aggregated consumer demand function on the market. 
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Similar to Armstrong (2006), firms are assumed to generate constant net profits from 
advertising. For simplicity, we assume advertisements to be standardized, so that firms only 
decide whether or not to place an advertisement. Therefore a single firm’s advertising demand 
qa is either 0 or 1. The firm’s net profit is given by 
(3)  { }1,0,)( ∈⋅⋅−⋅=Π aacaaaa qqdpqq µ , 
where pa is the per-contact advertising price, so that the firm has to pay pa·dc to place an 
advertisement. µ is the parameter that describes the gross benefit of advertising. Firms are 
assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to µ, and µ is assumed to be continuously 
distributed on [0, msa·dc]. The expression msa·dc, with msa > 0 determines the size of the 
advertising market. Note that the net profit to be gained from advertising and therefore the 
size of the advertising market, depends on consumer demand. The economic intuition is 
straightforward: The higher the demand for the good, the more consumers will be exposed to 
the advertisement, the more profitable advertising becomes to a firm. Firms are willing to 
advertise, if their net profit from doing so is positive, that is if 
caaa dp ⋅≥⇔=Π≥Π µ0)0()1( . 
Hence, total advertising demand is given by  
(4) ( ) caca
dms
dp
caa dpdmsddpd
ca
aa
⋅−⋅=⋅= ∫
⋅
⋅
µ1, . 
This specific functional form assures that da(pa,0) = 0, which implies that there is no demand 
for advertising if consumer demand is equal to zero. 
Solving equations (2) and (4) for pc and pa, respectively, yields the inverse demand functions. 
We assume fixed and variable costs to be zero and capacity constraints to be non-binding. 
Thus, the monopolist’s optimization problem is  
( ) 


 −⋅⋅+−⋅−⋅=Π
c
a
acacaccMdd d
dmsddddemsd
ac ,
max , 
yielding the first order conditions 
( )η⋅−⋅= acc dmsd 2
1 , where amse −=η  
η⋅⋅−= ca dd 2
1  
Therefore, the optimal monopoly solution is 
(5) 24
2
η−
⋅= cMc msd    (6) 42 −
⋅= η
η cM
a
msd  
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(7) ( )24
2
η
η
−
⋅+⋅= caMc msmsp   (8) 2
aM
a
msep += , 
and yields a monopoly profit of 
(9) 2
2
4 η+=Π
cM ms . 
 
An economically plausible solution requires that demands and profit are nonnegative, i.e. 
0,, ≥ΠMMaMc dd . Note that optimal pricing on two-sided markets might involve prices below 
marginal cost (“subsidization”) for one market side. To determine economically plausible 
parameter ranges, we consider three cases:1 
If consumers are ad-averse (e > 0), msa,e( )∈ msa > 0, max(0,msa − 2) < e ≤ msa( ){ } yields 
plausible solutions. For ad-neutral consumers (e = 0), 0 < msa < 2 is required and in case 
consumers are ad-likers (e < 0), the monopoly model yields plausible results for 
msa,e( )∈ 0 < msa < 2, msa − 2 < e < 0( ){ }. 
 
3. A Model of Duopolistic Competition 
 
In this section, we develop a model of duopolistic competition in order to identify competitive 
effects on the market that has been presented in the former section. Since our paper focuses 
on the comparison of monopoly and duopoly markets, all assumptions of Section 2 remain, 
except that we now assume the market to be served by two identical platforms, denoted 
i = 1,2.  
The consumption good offered by both platforms is assumed to be perfectly homogenous (e.g. 
two multiplexes offering the same menu of movies in direct proximity). Just like the 
monopolist, the duopolists are assumed to produce without variable and fixed costs. 
Consumers are assumend to be the same utility-maximizing individuals they were in the 
previous section. Additionally, we assume that consumers are required to single-home, that is, 
if they buy, they will have to decide for one and only one platform to buy from (e.g. a 
moviegoer can only be in one cinema at the same time). Obviously, consumers will prefer the 
platform that offers most net utility. If consumers’ net utility is equal on both platforms, 
aggregate demand is assumed to be equally shared among the two operators. Thus, using 
                                                 
1 Remember that we restricted msc > 0. Since throughout (5) - (9) msc only appears -if at all- as a factor in the 
nominator, and therefore only has a scaling function, we will ignore msc in the parameter sets to simplify 
notation. We will apply this simplification throughout the paper. 
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equation (1) for qc = 1 and equation (2), the consumer demand function platform operator i 
faces is 
(10) ( ) jiji
pdepdeforpdems
pdepdeforpdems
pdepdefor
dpd
j
c
j
a
i
c
i
a
i
c
i
ac
j
c
j
a
i
c
i
a
i
c
i
ac
j
c
j
a
i
c
i
a
i
a
i
c
i
c ≠=



−⋅−>−⋅−−⋅−
−⋅−=−⋅−−⋅−
−⋅−<−⋅−
= ,2,1,
2
0
,
θθ
θθ
θθ
 
  
Unlike consumers, advertisers are allowed to multi-home, which implies that they can place a 
single unit of advertising on one platform only or on both platforms simultaneously. 
Therefore, the advertisers’ decision problem only depends on the advertising price and the 
consumer demand of the corresponding platform. In other words, platform i’s advertising 
demand does not directly depend on platform j’s behavior.2 Using equation (4), advertising 
demand of platform i is therefore given by 
(11) ( ) ( )iaaiciciaicaiciaia pmsddpdmsdpd −⋅=⋅−⋅=, , 
which is analog to Section 2. 
 
We assume that both platforms compete in a Bertrand-type pricing game, simultaneously 
choosing prices pci and pai . Since the platforms are perfectly identical, we focus on symmetric 
equilibria.3 Generally, a symmetric solution for i,j = 1,2 ,  i ≠ j is characterized by  
s
c
j
c
i
c ppp ==  and sajaia ppp == , 
which implies 
(12) ( )
2
s
cs
a
s
a
j
a
i
a
dpmsaddd ⋅−=== , 
where das is the advertising demand faced by one platform operator, while dcs is the aggregate 
consumer demand in the market, equally shared among the operators, given any symmetric 
solution pcs and pas. In order to calculate dcs, we have to take into account that single-homing 
consumers are interested in the amount of advertising on each platform, which is das. The 
total number of ads dai + daj = 2 · das is not relevant for consumers’ decision making. Thus, 
using equations (2) and (12), aggregate consumer demand is given by 
(13) ( ) ( )saa
s
ccs
c
s
c
s
cs
aac
s
c
s
ac
s
c
pmse
pmsdpdpmsemspdemsd
−⋅⋅+
−=⇔−⋅−⋅−=−⋅−=
2
112
, 
                                                 
2 It is, of course, indirectly dependent of j’s behavior, because dai depends on dci, and by (10), dci depends on dcj. 
3 See Nilssen and Sørgard (2001) for a model with heterogeneous platforms and asymmetric equilibria. 
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so that das can be expressed as 
(14) ( ) ( )saa
s
ccs
aa
s
a pmse
pmspmsd −⋅+
−⋅−=
2
. 
Therefore, for any given pcs and pas, firm i’s profit in the symmetry case is  
(15) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )



−⋅+
−⋅−+⋅−⋅+
−=Π s
aa
s
ccs
a
s
a
s
cs
aa
s
ccs
a
s
c
s
i pmse
pmspmsapp
pmse
pmspp
22
, . 
 
Suppose that the candidate equilibrium (pc*, pa*) is characterized by 
***
c
j
c
i
c ppp ==    *** ajaia ppp == . 
In this case, platform operator i’s deviation strategies can be defined as 
( ) ****//// ,, jcjajcjalowiclowialowialowic pppdepdeforpp −⋅−<−⋅− θθ  
( ) ****//// ,, jcjajcjaequalicequaliaequaliaequalic pppdepdeforpp −⋅−=−⋅− θθ , 
( ) ****//// ,, jcjajcjahighichighiahighiahighic pppdepdeforpp −⋅−>−⋅− θθ  
where (pci/low, pai/low) is a strategy that implies lower consumer utility, (pci/equal, pai/lequal) is a 
strategy that implies the same consumer utility, and (pci/high, pai/high) is a strategy that implies 
higher consumer utility than strategy (pc*, pa*). Note that platform operator i might deviate by 
changing one or both prices, and that the operator might alter both price in the same direction 
or in opposing directions. Therefore the indices low, equal, and high do not imply prices in 
the deviation strategy being higher, equal or lower than the equilibrium candidate prices. 
  
The well-known condition for a Nash equilibrium is that operator i cannot deviate profitably, 
which means that (pc*, pa*) is an equilibrium, if and only if 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )**//**** ,,,,,, jajclowialowicijajciaicsi pppppppp Π≥Π  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )**//**** ,,,,,, jajcequaliaequalicijajciaicsi pppppppp Π≥Π , 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )**//**** ,,,,,, jajchighiahighicijajciaicsi pppppppp Π≥Π  
Thus, in order to find equilibria, we will have to analyze these cases separately. We will do 
this, using the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 1: If platform operator i deviates by choosing any (pci/low , pai/low), the resulting 
profit is always Πilow(.) = 0. 
Proof: Equation (10) implies that dci(.) = 0, which means that demand for platform i is taking 
the value zero as all consumers will decide to use the rival platform j. In addition, using 
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equation (11) we obtain dai(.) = 0, because advertisers are not willing to place an ad on 
platform i, when there are no consumers. Thus, for any (pci/low, pai/low) i’s  profit is zero. 
 
As economic intuition suggests, it is not profitable for a platform operator to deviate by 
offering less consumer utility than the rival platform. Since any equilibrium with Πi(.) < 0 is 
not economically plausible, there will never be an incentive for operator i to charge 
(pci/low, pai/low). Therefore, this strategy can be neglected for further analysis of candidate 
equilbria.   
 
Proposition 2: Suppose platform operator i is maximizing her profit, while offering the same 
utility as operator j by charging any (pci/equal , pai/equal). Then, it is always profit-maximizing to 
charge the monopoly advertising price. 
Proof: Since both platforms offer equal consumer utility, we know that  
(16) ⇔−⋅−=−⋅−⇔−⋅−=−⋅− **//**// jcjaequalicequaliajcjaequalicequalia pdepdepdepde θθ  
*/*/ j
c
equali
a
j
a
equali
c pdedep +⋅−⋅=  
must hold, which also implies that i’s consumer demand, denoted by dci/equal, is fixed. Solving 
(11) for the advertising price yields the inverse advertising demand as  
equali
c
equali
a
a
equali
a d
dmsp /
/
/ −= . 
Therefore, operator i’s (constrained) maximization problem is 
( ) ( ) equaliaequalicequali
c
equali
a
a
equali
c
j
c
equali
a
j
a
equali
ai ddd
d
msdpdeded ///
/
/*/*/max ⋅⋅


 −+⋅+⋅−⋅=Π , 
yielding 
(17) 
22
*/
/
*/ emspdd aequalia
equali
cequali
a
+=⇔⋅−= η , 
and the profit-maximizing advertising price is equal to the optimal monopoly advertising 
price (8). 
 
Proposition 2 implies a very important result: In any symmetric situation, operator i’s 
deviation profit implied by (17) is at least as great as the profit in the symmetric situation 
(proof: see Appendix 1). Therefore, in any symmetric situation there is an incentive to charge 
the monopoly advertising price. Since the platforms are identical, we can expect that 
daj* = dai/equal*, so that (16) simplifies to pci/equal = pcj*. Thus, we can tentatively conclude that a 
symmetric equilibrium requires  
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(18) 
2
** emspp aja
i
a
+==  
for any pci* = pcj*. However, at this stage of our analysis the equilibrium level of the consumer 
price remains unspecified. 
 
Proposition 3: When offering consumers more net utility than her rival firm, thus charging 
(pci/high , pai/high), platform operator i’s profit-maximizing strategy is either (i) the monopoly 
solution or (ii) dci/high = msc – pcj*. 
Proof: In order to attract all consumers, the constraint 
(19) **//**// jc
j
a
highi
c
highi
a
j
c
j
a
highi
c
highi
a pdepdepdepde −⋅−>−⋅−⇔−⋅−>−⋅− θθ  
must be satisfied. From equation (10) we know that consumer demand for operator i is  
(20) highic
highi
ac
highi
c
highi
c
highi
ac
highi
c ddemsppdemsd
////// −⋅−=⇔−⋅−= . 
As long as (19) is satisfied, rival platform j’s consumer demand is equal to zero, which 
implies that j’s advertising demand is also zero. Therefore, we assume that consumers 
anticipate that da j* = 0, so that (19) simplifies to 
(21) ( ) */*/// jcchighicjchighichighiachighia pmsdpddemsde −>⇔−>−⋅−−⋅− . 
The corresponding (Kuhn-Tucker-) optimization problem for operator i can be expressed as 
( ) ( ) highiahighichighi
c
highi
a
a
highi
c
highi
ac
highi
c
highi
a
highi
ci ddd
d
msddemsddd ///
/
///// ,max ⋅


 −+−⋅−⋅=Π  
( )*/ jcchighic pmsd +−+ λ , 
which yields the monopoly solution of Section 2 if (21) is not binding, i.e. λ = 0. In case (21) 
is binding (λ > 0)4, operator i will choose the slightest possible dci/high without violating the 
constraint. The resulting solution is approximately  
(22) **/ jcc
highi
c pmsd −= , 
while pai/high* still matches the monopoly solution and dai/high* becomes 
( )
2
*
*/ η⋅−= c
j
chighi
a
mspd . 
Using dai/high* as well as equations (20) and (22), the resulting consumer price is desribed by 
( ) ***/
2
j
c
j
cchighi
c p
pmsep +⋅−⋅= η . 
Therefore, operator i’s deviation profit can be expressed as 
                                                 
4 It can be shown that there is no equilibrium in the non-binding case as deviation to the monopoly solution 
would always be profitable, and the monopoly solution is not an equilibrium. 
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(23) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]**2** 4
4
1 j
c
j
cc
j
cc
j
c
high
i ppmspmsp ⋅+−⋅⋅−⋅=Π η . 
 
The symmetric equilibrium is characterized by the results of Propositions 2 and 3. As stated 
before, Proposition 2 implies that both platform operators charge the monopoly advertising 
price in equilibrium, given any consumer price. The equilibrium consumer price can be 
obtained by the results of Proposition 3, because there is no incentive for deviation, if the 
deviation profit, given by (23), equals the platform’s profit in the symmetry case. Therefore, 
in equilibrium 
( ) ( )*** , acsichighi ppp Π=Π  
must hold. Given (18) and using equations (15) and (23), the equilibrium consumer price5 is 
(24) ( )( )[ ]ζηηη cac msmseep ⋅⋅−−⋅⋅+⋅⋅= 12820
2
* , where 
( )( )( )[ ] 321281244 2 −⋅−⋅+−⋅+⋅⋅= aa msmsee ηηηζ . 
The equilibrium is therefore characterized by (17) and (24), yielding 
(25) ( )ζ
ηη ⋅−⋅⋅⋅=== emsddd cjaiaa 24***  
(26) ( )ζ
η 2ms8 c*** −⋅⋅⋅=== eddd jcicc  
(27) ( )( )( )( )222*** 24268 ζ ηηηη −⋅−⋅⋅+−⋅⋅⋅⋅=Π=Π=Π eemsems acji , 
where an economically plausible symmetric equilibrium solution obviously requires  
( ) ( ) ( ) 0,,,,, ****** ≥Π acsaacscacsi ppdppdpp . 
 
To obtain economically plausible results, we need to restrict the parameter values as follows: 
In case of ad-aversion (e > 0), economically plausible values result for  
( ) ( ){ },,0, aaa msemsems ≤≤>∈ α  where 
α = R2 of ( ) ( ) x6-ms+x-1ms2+ 2a2a3 ⋅⋅⋅x .6 
                                                 
5 There is another symmetric equilibrium for pc* = msc, which generates a corner solution and will be ignored for 
the rest of the paper. 
6 Rl, l = 1,...,n, denotes the l-th real-valued polynomial root in ascending order of the corresponding polynom of 
degree n. 
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For ad-likers (e < 0) various intervals yield plausible solutions. Since we are eventually 
interested in a comparison of monopoly and duopoly, we will only present the parameters that 
are compatible with the monopoly model as well:7  
( )









 +−<<−<<∈
2
8
2,10,
2
aa
aaa
msms
emsmsems . 
In case of ad-neutrality (e = 0), profit is strictly negative, so that there is no economically 
plausible solution. 
 
4. Analysis of the Model 
 
In the previous sections we developed a competitive bottleneck two-sided market model and 
determined the monopolist’s optimum as well as the duopolists’ equilibrium outcomes. In this 
section we are going to study these outcomes more deeply. We will specifically focus on the 
comparison of monopoly and duopoly in terms of prices, quantities, and welfare. 
Furthermore, we will focus rather on those cases that are counterintuitive or contrary to 
common economic knowledge from traditional one-sided markets, i.e. cases in which 
equilibrium duopoly prices equal or even exceed optimal monopoly prices. 
We restrict parameter sets to those sets that yield plausible values for both models 
simultaneously. This rules out the case of ad-neutrality, because there are no plausible 
parameter sets in this case for the duopoly model. It is easy to see that the parameter 
restrictions necessary for the duopoly model are tighter than the ones for the monopoly 
model. Therefore, the analysis of this section is limited to parameter sets satisfying 
( ) ( ){ }aaa msemsems ≤≤>∈ α,0,  
in the case of ad-aversion, and  
( )









 +−<<−<<∈
2
8
2,10,
2
aa
aaa
msms
emsmsems  
in the case of ad-liking. 
 
The first question we are interested in is, if there exist economically plausible parameter 
triples (msa, msc, e) that equalize consumer prices in monopoly and duopoly. Remember that 
by Proposition 2, the equilibrium price for advertising is equal to the monopoly price given by 
(8). In other words, we are now searching for cases in which there is no observable price 
                                                 
7 A full list of parameter ranges for this case is available upon request from the authors. 
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effect of competition. To do so, we equate (7) with (24) and solve for economically plausible 
triples (msa, msc, e) that satisfy the equation. Since msc already turned out to be a nonnegative 
scaling factor only, we will suppress it in the notation, that is, we will give tuples (msa, e) 
only. 
In the case of ad-liking consumers, the only case in which consumer prices become equal is 
the corner solution cc msp = . Therefore we will not further discuss the case of ad-liking, and 
continue with ad-averse consumers. In this case there are two types of valid tuples (msa, e) for 
which consumer price equality holds. First there are solutions that yield negative consumer 
prices. We will call these solutions “subsidization solutions”, since the platform operator 
charges consumer prices below marginal cost in order to increase consumer demand, which in 
turn will attract more advertisers. Note that we assumed marginal costs to be zero. Therefore a 
negative price in our model can generally be interpreted as a price below marginal cost. The 
second type of solutions yields positive prices towards both market sides. (28) gives 
parameter sets that yield equal prices in monopoly and duopoly. 
 
(28) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }γδγβ ≥<<∈ eeemsa ,,2,,2,22, , where 
β = R1 of 32+12e+8e-e+2e)-5e+(-e4x +2)-8e-(3e2x+)e-(1 e4x+e 246352422324x , 
γ = R4 of 1+47x-3x 24 , and 
 δ = R3 of 32+12e+8e-e+2e)-5e+(-e4x +2)-8e-(3e2x+)e-(1 e4x+e 246352422324x . 
 
The first set ( )2,22  is a corner solution yielding  
3
4* c
cc
M
c
msdmsd ⋅=<=  and ccMc mspp −== * , 
which implies zero profits in the duopoly case. The second set ( )γβ << e2,  yields negative 
consumer prices, while the third set ( )γδ ≥e,  yields positive prices.  
Evaluated at any (msa, e) of (28), we see that  
*** 2, a
M
aa
M
cc ddddd ⋅<<> , and MΠ<Π⋅ *2 . 
Remember that da* is advertising per duopolist, hence 2·da* is total advertising on the duopoly 
market. (28) describes a situation, in which the mere fact that -all else equal- the market is 
served by two identical firms instead of one, causes an increase in total consumer demand. 
The reason for this is the two-sidedness of the market or more precisely, the effect of a 
decreasing amount of advertising on consumer utility. To illustrate the economics of this case, 
we do the following gedankenexperiment: Starting from some monopolistic optimum dcM > 0, 
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daM > 0, we imagine that -all else equal- the monopolist is replaced by two identical, but 
independent platforms. In this case, total consumer demand dcM will be equally divided 
among the two platforms. As a consquence, advertising with one platform only reaches half 
of the consumers, which will reduce advertising demand per platform to some dan < daM. 
Since we assumed e > 0, the decrease in advertising exposure increases total consumer 
demand to some dcn > dcM. This increase in consumer demand in turn increases advertising 
demand. However, eventually the increase does not offset the decreasing effect, so that the 
total effect on advertising per platform is negative, from which follows that the total effect on 
consumer demand is positive. 
 
The follow-up question to the results established above is, whether duopoly equilibrium 
consumer prices might even exceed optimal monopoly consumer prices. Again, we only need 
to consider the case of ad-aversion, since there is no parameter set that creates this effect if 
consumers are ad-likers. As before, there are subsidization solutions and solutions with 
positive prices. However, it is now also possible that the monopolist charges negative 
consumer prices, while the duopolists do not. In the case of subsidization, less negative prices 
in the duopoly case can be interpreted as a lower subsidization of consumers as compared to 
the monopoly case. (29) describes parameter sets given which the duopoly equilibrium 
consumer price exceeds the optimal monopoly consumer price. 
(29) ( )









 ≥+⋅+−≤<


 <+⋅+−≤<∈ γδγβ e
e
eems
e
eemsems aaa ,
141,e<2,141,
2222
 
Evaluated at any (msa, e) of (29), we see that  
MΠ<Π⋅ *2  and Maa dd <* , 
which is so far consistent with the results obtained from (28). However, we cannot draw 
general conclusions about the relationship of *cd  and 
M
cd , and of 
M
ad  and 
*2 ad . 
Refining (29) for those solutions that yield negative consumer prices, we obtain 
(30) ( )

















 >+⋅+−≤<



 ≤+⋅+−≤<
∈
κω
κβ
e
e
eems
e
eems
ems
a
a
a
,141
,e<2,141
,
22
22
, where 
κ = R2 of 36-32x+10x-x 246 , and  
ω = R1 of 20e-8e+e-)x3e+16e-(12+)x3e-(8e+xe 35522332 . 
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In case  



 ≤+⋅+−≤< κβ e<2,141
22
e
eemsa , 
 Maa dd >⋅ *2  and Mcc dd >*  hold, while for  



 >+⋅+−≤< κω e
e
eemsa ,
141 22  
the relationships of *cd  and 
M
cd  and 
M
ad  and 
*2 ad⋅  are still ambigous. 
 
Parameter sets that yield a mixed case, in which a monopolist will subsidize while the 
duopolists will not, are described by (31). 
(31) ( )









 >≤<++∈ κδ emseeems aa ,2
8,
2
 
The results in case of (31) are analogue to the results of the second solution of (30): da* < daM 
and 2·П* < ПM hold, while the relationship of dc* and dcM as well as daM and 2·da* is ambigous. 
 
Positive prices result, if 
(32) ( )









 >++<<


 <<++<<∈ βδγκβ eeemseeemsems aaa ,2
8,,
2
8,
22
. 
For both solutions of (32) it holds that *** 2, a
M
aa
M
cc ddddd <<> , and MΠ<Π⋅ *2 . 
 
Table 1 summarizes the results. 
Case *cd ⋛ Mcd  *ad ⋛ Mad  *2 ad ⋛ Mad  *2 Π⋅ ⋛ MΠ
Subsidization > < > < M
cc pp =*  
Positive Prices > < > < 
Subsidization 1 > < > < 
Subsidization 2 ⋛ < ⋛ < 
Mixed ⋛ < ⋛ < 
M
cc pp >*  
Positive Prices > < > < 
Table 1: Relationship of quantities and profits, if consumer prices are equal or if the duopoly 
consumer price exceeds the monopoly consumer price. 
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Most notably, even though prices in the monopoly are not higher than in duopoly, monopoly 
profit still is strictly greater than total profit in the duopoly. This is in line with Chaudhri 
(1998), who compares monopoly and perfectly competitive newspaper markets, and finds that 
“(u)pon attaining monopoly control of a newspaper market, a proprietor, for reasonable 
parameter values […] opts to lower the price for her newspaper, which increases circulation, 
and hence, increased advertising revenue” (p.74). 
 
Finally, we will study the welfare effects imposed by our model. Since we assumed zero costs 
of production, monopoly profit, resp. the sum of both provider’s profits is equal to producer 
surplus. Traditional “consumer surplus” here is the sum of the surplus created on both market 
sides. In the monopoly case, the market side we labeled “consumers” realizes a benefit of  
( ) ( )220 4
2, −
⋅=⋅−∫ η cMcMcc
d
M
ac
M
c
mspdddddp
M
c
, 
where Mcd  is given by (5), 
M
ad  is given by (6), 
M
cp  is given by (7), and ( )⋅Mcp  is the inverse 
of (2). In the duopoly case the consumer side realizes a surplus of 
( ) ( )2 22**2
0
* 21282, ζ
η c
ccc
d
ac
d
c
msepdddddp
i
c ⋅⋅−⋅=⋅−∫ , 
where *cd  is given by (26), 
*
ad  is given by (25), 
*
cp  is given by (24), and ( )⋅dcp  is the inverse 
of (13). Advertisers obtain a surplus of  
( ) ( )2
2
0 44
, η
η
−⋅
⋅=⋅−∫ cMaMaa
d
M
ca
M
a
mspdddddp
M
a
, 
where Mcd  is given by (5), 
M
ad  is given by (6), 
M
ap  is given by (8), and ( )⋅Map  is the inverse 
of (4) in the monopoly case, and  
( ) ( )ζηη caaa
d
ca
d
a
msepdddddp
a ⋅−⋅⋅⋅=


 ⋅−⋅ ∫ 22,2 2**
0
*
*
 
in the duopoly case, where *cd  is given by (26), 
*
ad  is given by (25), 
M
aa pp =*  is given by (8), 
and ( )⋅dap  is the inverse of (12). 
 
Welfare is given by the sum of producer, consumer, and advertiser surplus. Table 2 
summarizes the relation of total welfare in monopoly optimum and duopoly equilibrium as 
well as the relations of the individual welfare components. 
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Case Consumer Surplus 
Advertiser 
Surplus 
Producer 
Surplus 
Total 
Welfare 
Subsidization ⋛ ⋛ < ⋛ M
cc pp =*  
Positive Prices > > < > 
Subsidization 1 > > < ⋛ 
Subsidization 2 ⋛ ⋛ < ⋛ 
Mixed ⋛ ⋛ < ⋛ 
M
cc pp >*  
Positive Prices > > < > 
Left hand side = duopoly equilibrium; right hand side = monopoly optimum 
Table 2: Comparison of welfare effects for ad-averse consumers. 
 
5. Conclusion and Implications 
The results of the above analysis have implications on multiple fields of economic research. 
Keep in mind that we are studying a competitive bottleneck two-sided private goods market 
with perfect information, and that the analysis of our model is focussed on those parameter 
sets that are economically plausible and yield price effects contrary to economic intuition 
from one-sided markets, namely duopoly equilibrium prices being at least as high as 
monopoly prices. Furthermore it turned out that the cases we deem interesting require ad-
averse consumers, that is a negative impact of demand from the multi-homing market side to 
the single-homing one. 
As summarized in Table 1, there are cases in which total consumer demand in the duopoly 
equilibrium exceeds consumer demand in the monopoly optimum. On first sight, this result 
does not seem too surprising as it is a well-known relationship and a reason to foster 
competition. On second thought, the reason for higher equilibrium consumer demand in 
textbook oligopoly models is that oligopolistic competition yields lower consumer prices than 
in the monopoly case, and therefore demand increases. In our analysis, we explicitly study 
cases in which prices are equal in monopoly and duopoly. Hence, the two-sidedness of the 
market holds a demand enhancing effect, caused by the mere fact that total consumer demand 
is now equally splitt between two platforms instead of being served by one platform only. 
The two-sidedness of the market also contributes an alternative explanation for a missing 
price effect of competition. On one-sided markets, there are generally two explanations for 
missing price effects: Either the monopolist does not or cannot make use of her monopoly 
power for some reason or the oligopolists collude implicitly or explicitly. On two-sided 
markets, there might just be no price effect of competition. As Table 1 suggests, there is a 
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competitive effect that causes total profits in the duopoly equilibrium to be strictly lower than 
in the monopoly case, and total advertising demand to be lower in monopoly than in duopoly. 
We neither restrict the monopolist’s optimization problem artificially nor do we hinder 
competition between the duopolists. Still and regardless of competition taking place, there is 
no observable price effect, given any of the parameter sets described by (28), and competition 
even increases prices given any of the parameter sets described by (29)-(32). 
 
A price effect of competition, however, is the underlying assumption of empirical price-
concentration studies. These studies presume that prices increase with the concentration of the 
market, and try to estimate the magnitude of this effect. Our results suggest that this 
relationship might be negative, given certain exogenous conditions as described by (29)-(32). 
Therefore, empirical analyses yielding a negative price-concentration effect, e.g. in the movie 
theater industry, do not necessarily suffer from methodological or technological mistakes. If, 
however, the exogenous conditions are in such a way as described by (28), then there is 
obviously no price effect of competition that could be measured. This implies that the absence 
of significant empirical results cannot be interpreted as lack of competition, unless it is 
verified that none of the parameter sets of (28) is present in the industry under consideration. 
In this light, it is also not sensible to follow Weyl (2006) and study the sum of the prices, 
which he calls the “price level”, instead of the “price balance” that describes the relation of 
the prices of the two market sides. 
Regarding the welfare effects of competition, we obtain ambigous results and need to 
distinguish our conclusions by the price level as in Table 2. In case of positive prices, i.e. in 
case of prices above marginal cost, total welfare is always higher in the duopoly equilibrium 
than in the monopoly optimum, even though consumer prices might be lower under 
monopoly. In case of subsidization, this is not necessarily true. Therefore, policy makers as 
well as regulators aiming at welfare maximization will have to obtain in-dept knowledge of 
the environment (i.e. the parameter set) they are facing before being able to act optimally. A 
brief glance at the prevailing price level or price balance will not suffice to make a sensible 
judgement. Unlike on common one-sided markets, fostering competition will not necessarily 
increase welfare. Similarly, merger control becomes more difficult. Under conditions of 
positive prices, mergers generally have a negative impact on total welfare. Under conditions 
of subsidized consumer prices, we cannot draw general conclusions. If, for some exogenous 
reason, a merger has to take place anyway, it will virtually always imply that one platform 
closes down (proof: see Appendix 2). This is in line with the regulator’s objective of welfare 
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maximization, because welfare increases, if the operator of the two merged platforms closes 
down one of them. It even holds for distributive objectives, i.e. consumer surplus, advertiser 
surplus, and producer surplus all increase, if the operator closes down one platform in case of 
a merger (see also Appendix 2). 
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Appendix 1: 
Proof: Proposition 2 implies that operator i’s deviation profit is at least as great as the 
profit in the corresponding symmetric situation: 
Respecting that pci/equal is restricted by (16), the deviation profit departing from any symmetric 
situation (pas, pcs) is given by 
equali
c
equali
a
aequali
c
s
c
equali
a
s
a
equal
i dd
emsdpdede ////
2
)( ⋅⋅++⋅+⋅−⋅=Π . 
Deviation from the symmetric situation will be take place, iff the profit from doing so is not 
lower than the profit in the symmetric situation, which is  
( ) ( )sasascscsascsi dppdpp ⋅+⋅=Π , . 
Proposition 2 assumes a deviation strategy which yields the same consumer utility as the 
corresponding symmetrical situation. Therefore dci/equal= dcs is fixed. 
Using (17), evaluating the inverse demand function obtained from (11) at (das, dcs), and 
respecting that economic plausibility implies dcs ≥ 0, it is easy to see that si
equal
i Π≥Π  becomes 
after some algebraic manipulation 
( ) ( )
equali
c
s
as
a
equali
c d
ddd /
22
/
4
−⋅−≥− ηη  
Note that all expressions in this inequality are fixed, except for das on the right hand side. The 
expression on the right hand side has its maximum at  
2
/ equali
cs
a
dd ⋅−= η . 
Evaluating the inequality at this maximum yields  
( ) ( )
44
2
/
2
/ ηη −≥− equalicequalic dd , 
which is always true. q.e.d. 
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Appendix 2: 
Explicit collusion or merger on the duopoly market: 
Assume, both platform operators are able and willing to cooperate in order to maximize joint 
profits. Given (10) and (11), the operators have two options: Either they equally divide 
consumer demand between their platforms or they close down one platform and create a 
monopoly. In the first case -for reasons to be seen soon, we label it “hypothetical collusion 
case”- the optimization problem is  
∑
=


⋅+

⋅⋅=Π
2
1, 2
,
22
,
2
max
i
ci
a
i
c
cci
a
i
a
ci
ak
dd
ddpdddpdd
i
ac
 
which yields a maximum profit of  
2
2
8
2
η−
⋅=Π ck ms , 
optimal quantities  
8
4
2 −
⋅= η
ck
c
msd  and 
82
,2,1
−
⋅=== η
η ck
a
k
a
k
a
msddd , 
 and optimal prices 
( )
2
,,2,1
8
4
η
η
−
⋅+⋅=== cakickckc msmsppp  and Makiakaka pppp === ,,2,1 . 
Given the nonnegativity constraints on msa and msc, and the parameter restrictions implied by 
the nonnegativity of kΠ  and MΠ , the maximum hypothetical collusion profit never exceeds 
the optimal monopoly profit (9). Furthermore, there is only one corner solution, in which both 
profits become equal. Therefore, explicit collusion or merger always implies that the 
operators close down one platform to play the monopoly solution, except, if 
( ) ( )0,, >= eeemsa , in which case the operators are indifferent between keeping both platforms 
open and closing down one. 
 
Assume that for some exogenous reason it is not possible to close down one location. In case 
of a merger, this might be due to obligations of a regulating authority. To study the welfare 
effects in this case, we compute hypothetical consumer surplus as 
( ) ( )22
2
0 8
8, −
⋅=⋅−∫ η ckckcc
d
k
ac
k
c
mspdddddp
k
c
, where 
cac
k
ccc ddemsppp −⋅−=== 21 . 
Hypothetical advertiser surplus is  
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,2 η
η
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⋅=


 ⋅−⋅ ∫ ckakaa
d
k
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k
a
mspdddddp
k
a
, where 
c
a
a
k
aaa d
dmsppp ⋅−=== 221 . 
Comparing consumer, advertiser, and producer surplus of the hypothetical collusion case and 
the monopoly optimum, we find that each of these welfare components is at least as great in 
the monopoly case as it is in the hypothetical collusion case. Therefore total welfare in the 
hypothetical collusion case also never exceeds total welfare in the monopoly case. 
Comparing welfare outcomes of hypothetical collusion and duopoly equilibrium case, we 
need to distinguish the cases known from Section 4 and obtain the results presented in Table 
A1. 
Case Consumer Surplus 
Advertiser 
Surplus 
Producer 
Surplus 
Total 
Welfare 
Subsidization ⋛ ⋛ ≤ ⋛ M
cc pp =*  
Positive Prices > > < > 
Subsidization 1 > > < > 
Subsidization 2 ⋛ ⋛ ≤ ⋛ 
Mixed ⋛ ⋛ ≤ ⋛ 
M
cc pp >*  
Positive Prices > > < > 
Left hand side = duopoly equilibrium; right hand side = duopoly collusion 
Table A1: Welfare in the case of explicit collusion 
